INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen an unprecedented expansion of international adjudication. 1 Consider the following four trends: 2 First, states have created a slew of new international courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial review bodies. Some of these new juridical entities have global reach; others are regional in scope. Some are true courts that hand down legally binding judgments; others issue only non-binding recommendations. Some hear only disputes between nation states; many others can receive and review complaints from private parties. Some enjoy capacious subject matter jurisdiction; others only narrow or technical competencies. 3 In addition to creating new international tribunals, states are recognizing the jurisdiction of both new and existing international tribunals in increasing numbers. They are ratifying treaties with respect to which international judicial review is mandatory. 4 And they are recognizing the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals even where their decision to do so is entirely optional and is not a condition of treaty membership.
Third, international tribunals are also actively utilized by states and by private parties, a fact demonstrated by the growing number of decisions they issue. According to a recent study based on cases decided through 2002, "more than 80% of the total international judicial activity (14946 out of 18277 cases heard by international tribunals) occurred in the last 13 years alone." 6 Fourth and finally, most international tribunals are independent of the states that created them. 7 Independence can be measured both formally and functionally. Formally, tribunals are independent when they are permanent bodies that exercise compulsory jurisdiction over the states that have ratified the treaty creating the tribunal, and are composed of judges appointed or elected for a term of years during which they are protected from removal except for cause. 8 As a matter of practical judicial decision-making, independence denotes the willingness of judges to decide cases based on generally applicable legal principles rather than political expediency, even where this requires ruling against powerful states.
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This paper focuses on formal independence, by which I mean the institutional features of a tribunal that insulate-but do not, as I explain below, isolate-its members from political pressures by states. I argue that states can enhance the credibility of their commitments by delegating authority to international tribunals that are formally independent. Having delegated such authority, however, states face the risk that the members of independent tribunals will seek to expand their authority or recognize new legal norms, and thus to impose greater restrictions upon the national governments subject to its jurisdiction.
I offer a theory of "constrained independence" to explain how states counter this potential for overreaching without abandoning independent international adjudication altogether. In particular, I argue that states use formal, structural, political, and discursive control mechanisms, both before an independent tribunal is established and after it begins operating, to convey to its members the range of judicial outcomes that are politically tolerable. It is these more finegrained control mechanisms that allow states to capture the credibility-enhancing benefits of 7 The antithesis of an independent tribunal is ad hoc arbitration, in which states must agree to submit their dispute to an arbitral panel after their dispute has arisen. Ad hoc arbitration is also dependent in the sense that states select the decision-makers who will hear their dispute (or at least agree on the rules for selecting those decision makers) and they do only for purposes of resolving a specific controversy. 8 See, e.g., Treaty of Rome, art. 223 (requiring that judges, who serve for a renewable term of six years, be "persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of recognised competence"); Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 39(3), 40(1), (requiring that judges, who serve for a renewable term of nine years, be of "high moral character" and "either possess the qualifications required for appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized competence"). delegation to formally independent international tribunals while minimizing, although not eliminating, the potential for judicial excesses.
I. RATIONAL STATES, DELEGATION, AND THE PUZZLE OF INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
Why are states creating new independent tribunals, recognizing the jurisdiction of existing independent tribunals, and adjudicating cases before such tribunals? Delegating authority to independent judicial decision makers would seem to be contrary to the interests of rational, interest-maximizing states. A state that makes such a delegation constrains its sovereignty by giving judges or tribunal members the authority to decide that its domestic laws and practices are inconsistent with its international law obligations.
The restrictions on states' freedom of action that flow from delegation to independent tribunals create a puzzle for scholars of international affairs. As Andrew Moravcsik has pointedly framed the question: "Why would any government, democratic or dictatorial, favor establishing an effective independent international authority, the sole purpose of which is to constrain its domestic sovereignty in such an unprecedentedly invasive and overtly nonmajoritarian manner?" 10 This puzzle is magnified by the four empirical trends describe above, which reveal states that states are increasingly willing to create new independent tribunals and subject themselves to scrutiny by independent judges, tribunal members, and quasi-judicial decision makers.
One possible rationale for why states delegate authority to international dispute settlement bodies is found in the principal-agent literature. Viewed through the lens of principal-agent theory, international tribunals can be useful even to rational, sovereignty-maximizing states by providing information that reduces decision making costs for the states involved in a dispute. As Eric Posner and John Yoo have recently written:
[International] tribunals can benefit states that seek to cooperate with each other by providing relatively neutral information about the facts and law relevant to a particular dispute. This occurs in two settings. First, tribunals may play a role in producing valuable information to states involved in treaty disputes. States come into conflict when they take actions that violate, or appear to violate, treaties. Tribunals can help resolve such conflicts by discovering and revealing information about the meaning of the agreement and the nature of the allegedly infringing action. Second, when states come into conflict over conventions or customs governing the division of global resources, tribunals can discover facts, help develop new rules, or apply existing rules to new or unanticipated circumstances. 
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In this view of international adjudication, the members of the tribunal are the "agents" and the disputing states are the "principals." The dilemma facing the principals is how to capture the informational benefits of international tribunals while ensuring that the judge-agents remain faithful to the preferences of the states-principals as set forth in a treaty, customary international law, or arbitration agreement. In the parlance of principal-agent theory, this is "the problem of agency slack."
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To minimize slack, states should create tribunals that are "dependent." According to Posner and Yoo, fully dependent tribunals have specific characteristics. 13 They come into existence only after a dispute arises, only with the consent of the states concerned, and only for so long as the dispute itself exists. The jurisdiction dependent tribunals exercise is limited to the jurisdiction the parties confer upon it. And that jurisdiction is exercised by decision makers whom the parties themselves have chosen to resolve their dispute.
14 In sum, principal-agent theory views "independence [as] a measure of a tribunal member's vulnerability to the state that appoints him."
15 Aware of this vulnerability, dependent tribunals have a strong incentive to "render judgments that reflect the interests of the states at the time that they agree to submit the dispute to the tribunal."
16 By contrast, independent tribunals appear to "pose a danger to international cooperation" because they "render decisions that conflict with the interests of state parties" and "are more likely to allow moral ideals, ideological imperatives, or the interests of other states to influence their judgments."
17 Aware of this potential for overreaching, rational states seeking to preserve their sovereignty should refrain from delegating authority to independent tribunals over whom they exercise limited if any control.
II. DELEGATING AUTHORITY TO INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS SERVES THE INTERESTS OF STATES
The principal-agent theory of dependent international adjudication summarized above cannot be reconciled with an accurate assessment of the international legal landscape, in which an expanding number of independent tribunals are exercising jurisdiction over more states and deciding an increasing number of cases. If independent tribunals were behaving in the manner predicted by principal-agent theory, we should observe a decline in the number of such tribunals, in their caseloads, and in states' willingness to submit themselves to judicial scrutiny. 18 Since 12 Id. at __. 13 Posner and Yoo make clear that independence is a continuous variable and tribunals "can be more or less dependent." Id. at __.
14 Id. at __.
15 Id. at __.
16 Id. at 6. See also id. at ___ ("Because the arbitrator knows that he will have to deal with both states in the future, he does not want to risk alienating either of them, as this may create suspicion or provoke retaliation.").
17 Id. at __, __. 18 As Cesare Romano has pointedly posed the question, "Why create an expensive standing court or tribunal to settle future disputes when it is possible to submit the issue to an ad hoc arbitral body?" Cesare P.R. Romano, precisely the opposite trend is occurring, either states are acting wholly irrationally, or independent tribunals are serving states' interests in ways that a principal-agent theory fails to capture.
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In the sections that follow I offer a theory to explain these empirical trends. I first explain how delegation to independent tribunals enables states to enhance the credibility of their international law commitments. I then expand upon this settled theoretical framework, developing hypotheses that plausibly explain the conditions under which states delegate authority to independent rather than dependent tribunals. In particular, I argue that states choose independent judicial decision makers when they face specific types of multilateral cooperation problems for which non-legal mechanisms of credibility enhancement are unavailable.
Before proceeding, however, a caveat is in order. I do not contend that the independence or dependence of a tribunal is the only or even the most important factor in predicting whether that tribunal will be effective (in the sense of changing the behavior of the states subject to its jurisdiction) or will achieve a high rate of compliance with its judgments. 20 To the contrary, as I and a colleague have argued elsewhere, explaining the efficacy of international adjudication requires a multi-variable framework that examines factors within the control of member states that created the tribunal, factors within the control of the judges themselves, and factors beyond the control of either states or judges. 21 The independence of a tribunal and its members is only one of those factors. But the issue of tribunal independence has increased in salience as commentators have transposed to the international arena their apprehensions about independent (and, implicitly, unelected and unaccountable) domestic courts. Because of the fresh attentions being devoted to the 21 In Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, Anne Marie Slaughter and I distilled from four decades of commentary and analysis by judges, lawyers, and political scientists a checklist of thirteen factors that co-varied with effective supranational adjudication in Europe. Four of these factors were within the control of the states who created the tribunal (composition of the tribunal; its caseload and functional capacity; whether it possessed independent fact-finding capacity; and the formal authority of the instrument that the tribunal interprets); six factors were within the control of the judges themselves (awareness of audience; neutrality and demonstrated autonomy from political interests; incrementalism; quality of legal reasoning; judicial cross-fertilization and dialogue; and form of opinions); and three factors were beyond the control of either states or judges (nature of violations; autonomous domestic institutions committed to the rule of law and responsive to citizen interests; and the relative cultural and political homogeneity of states subject to a supranational tribunal). Helfer & Slaughter, supra note __, at 298-337.
independence of the international judiciary, 22 it is useful to isolate the explanatory variable of independence for separate treatment, even acknowledging that it is only one aspect of a far more complex real world phenomenon.
A.

Delegation Enhances the Credibility of International Commitments
Political scientists have long understood that delegating dispute settlement authority to independent decision makers can further rather than undermine government interests.
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Although such delegations may at first seem counterintuitive, they are explained by the functions that international tribunals perform. In the relatively anarchic environment of interstate relations, independent tribunals provide a mechanism to enhance the credibility of the otherwise less than fully credible promises that governments make to one another. 24 By exercising their delegated authority to interpret those promises and to identify behavior that violates them, independent tribunals increase the likelihood that states will comply with their obligations in situations where compliance generates short term political losses but long term political gains.
To see why this is so, consider the perennial dilemma facing states that negotiate international agreements. These states know that if each party honors its treaty commitments, all will be better off as compared to a baseline of no cooperation. But each state also has a strong incentive to violate its commitments, provided that the others continue to cooperate. defections are plausible in many (although by no means all) international regimes because of the difficulty of monitoring compliance and the absence of strong enforcement mechanisms. When these incentives to defect exist, there is a significant risk that international cooperation will unravel, leaving all states worse off. By holding states fast to their promises, independent international tribunals reduce the likelihood of defections and thus help states to solve the "dilemmas of common interest" 25 that so often underlie problems of international cooperation.
It might be argued, however, that this claim-that delegation of authority to international tribunals enhances the credibility of commitments-is circular in the following sense. Just as there is no coercive authority to enforce a state's initial promise to cooperate, there is also no such authority to compel adherence to the judgments of a tribunal which interprets that promise.
Seen from this perspective, independent international tribunals do nothing to enhance the credibility of commitments, since states can as easily disregard the tribunal's rulings as they can ignore the obligations of the treaty that establishes it.
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This argument misses the mark in several key respects. First, it ignores the informational functions that international tribunals perform and their effect on a state's reputation for honoring its promises to other nations. Not all compliance disputes are clear cut. To the contrary, it is often difficult for a state to monitor the conduct of its treaty partners and to evaluate whether that conduct violates the treaty. These monitoring and evaluation costs reduce the risk that arguably nonconforming conduct will be detected or, if detected, will be accurately labeled as a breach.
International tribunals reduce these monitoring and evaluation costs. They create a mandatory process 27 by which plausible rule violations are investigated and, at the conclusion of the case, they publicly identify the state that has violated its commitments. In short, tribunals increase the probability that violations of international obligations will be detected and correctly labeled as noncompliance. Krasner ed., 1983) (using a multi-player Prisoners' Dilemma to explain "dilemmas of common interests," which occur "when independent decision making leads to equilibrium outcomes that are Paretodeficient-outcomes in which all actors prefer another given outcome to the equilibrium outcome"). In the case of coordination games, international tribunals provide information to states in the form of "focal points" that clarify textual ambiguities or "signals" that cause parties to update their beliefs about facts. 26 See Scott & Stephan, supra note __, at 554-55 ("Agreements may fashion their own enforcement mechanisms, but these have no greater authority than the instructment that creates them."). 27 Mandatory either because a state has acceded to the tribunal's jurisdiction when ratifying the treaty or because it does so later through an optional protocol or declaration. In either case, the state recognizes the tribunal's mandatory authority prior to another state or private party filing a complaint against it.
The higher probability of detecting and accurately labeling violations creates two sets of costs for a state considering violating its international commitments. First, it increases the likelihood that other states will impose sanctions as a penalty for breach. These sanctions may be authorized by the tribunal itself (as in the case of monetary awards issued by the ECHR) or by a multilateral process connected to it (as in the case of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body).
29 Sanctions may also be imposed unilaterally through reductions in trade, aid, or other privileges previously granted by the adversely affected state. 30 Second, and perhaps more importantly, the higher probability of correctly identifying violations and branding violators increases the reputation costs of noncompliance.
31 "Being identified as having violated international law is costly for a state because it leads to a loss of reputation in the eyes of both its counterparty and other states," 32 a loss that, in turn, makes it more difficult to enter into future agreements with other nations.
By increasing the probability of both material sanctions and reputational harm, international tribunals raise the cost of violations, thereby increasing compliance and enhancing the value of Note, however, that a state's desire to cultivate or preserve a reputation as a law abiding nation may be insufficient to enhance the credibility of its commitments in the absence of some independent international review mechanism. Recent work on the role of reputation in inducing compliance with international law suggests that states do not have a single, blanket reputation for compliance generally, but many reputations, which vary by issue area or even by specific treaty. See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. Legal Stud. 95 (2002) . The existence of multiple reputations creates significant uncertainty. States are aware that the benefits and costs of compliance vary across different types of agreements. But given the imperfect information endemic to international affairs, they are often unsure of whether or to what extent positive or negative reputations will "bleed" from one treaty regime into another. One way to reduce this uncertainty is by using an independent tribunal or quasi-judicial review body as a signal to indicate that states are serious about the commitments they have undertaken. By binding themselves to adjudicate a particular class of treaty disputes before independent decision makers, states make it more difficult to hide their defections and avoid the sanctions or reputational consequences that flow from noncompliance. 32 Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note __, at 304-05. As Professors Schwartz and Sykes have recently observed:
One difficulty with reputational penalties, of course, is that they depend on the quality of information in the trading community about the behavior of violators. . . . This concern highlights the value of a central dispute authority to hear the merits of complaints, even if that authority has no power to authorize sanctions. By serving as a vehicle for transmitting information about violations throughout the trading system, central dispute resolution enhances the reputational costs of cheating. the agreement for all parties. 33 States can thus foresee that shirking compliance will be more difficult when a tribunal can be called upon to monitor their conduct and interpret their promises than when it cannot. As a result, when states delegate authority to an international tribunal, the commitments they entrust to it will be viewed as more credible than commitments not subject to judicial scrutiny. 34 The circularity objection described above also fails to account for domestic politics. The informational and reputational consequences of establishing a tribunal operate principally on an interstate level. However, tribunals and the decisions they issue also make international law more salient for domestic interest groups and political actors. By clarifying the meaning of an agreement, finding facts, and determining whether a particular course of conduct is justified, tribunal rulings can mobilize compliance constituencies to press government officials in favor of adherence to treaty obligations as interpreted by the tribunal. 35 This effect is most pronounced where private parties may invoke the tribunal's jurisdiction directly, since no "political filter" exists to screen out cases that are legally meritorious but diplomatically or politically embarrassing. 36 But the effect can also operate in purely interstate adjudication, if the tribunal's rulings benefit domestic interest groups who are motivated to lobby governments in favor of compliance. 37 In either case, the domestic political costs of international adjudication make it more difficult for states to shirk compliance. Anticipating this result, states will view international agreements superintended by tribunals (especially supranational tribunals) as more credible than agreements that do not provide for judicial review.
International tribunals can only make commitments more credible, however, if they are independent. If a tribunal were dependent-that is, if it were susceptible to pressure to conform its decisions to state interests at the time a dispute arises-the credibility enhancement flowing 33 Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note __, at 326 ("If states can commit, ex ante, to resolving their disputes before an impartial tribunal, they increase the sanction associate with a violation-even if that sanction is only reputational-and therefore increase compliance."). Cf. Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 Int'l Org. 73, 87 (2000) (empirical analysis demonstrating that sanctions enforced by a international organization are far more effective than sanctions enforced only by coalitions of states, and stating that such institutionalized sanctioning schemes increase the reputation costs of shirking a promise to sanction and "sends a signal" to other states "that backsliding is not likely to occur"). 34 This is not to suggest that delegation to international tribunals is cost free, nor that the costs will always outweigh the benefits. See Guzman, The Cost of Credibility, supra note __, at 306, 309-15 (presenting a formal model demonstrating that international tribunals generate credibility and compliance gains, but that only under certain conditions will those gains outweigh the costs of delegating mandatory dispute settlement authority to international tribunals). The foregoing analysis explains why states that are jealous of their sovereignty would choose to establish an international court, tribunal, or quasi-judicial review body whose members are independent. What is less well understood, however, is precisely how the interests of independent tribunals relate to the interests of the states that created them. As I explain below, states seeking to enhance the credibility of their commitments will be more likely to create an independent tribunal when they face three types of multilateral cooperation problems: (1) international agreements that require extensive modifications of existing national law and practices; (2) treaties that regulate public goods or commons problems; and (3) treaties that create rights or benefits for private parties.
"Deep" International Agreements
The first type of multilateral cooperation problem encompasses what Downs, Rocke, and Barsoon call "deep" agreements, i.e. treaties that require significant changes in state behavior from the status quo. 39 These scholars argue that the deeper the agreement, the greater the resistance to compliance and the stronger the enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms required to achieve it. Assuming this claim to be true, 40 an international tribunal that states establish to aid enforcement by identifying violations or authorizing the sanctioning of violators must hold the parties fast to their initial agreement or risk defections that cause cooperation to unravel.
Seen from this vantage point, the correlation between the "deepening" of the trade regime from the GATT to the WTO (as shown by its lower trade barriers and expanding subject areas) and the enhancement of judicial independence (from GATT panels to the WTO Appellate Body) is not accidental but causative. 41 It reflects an understanding by governments that greater judicial independence was necessary to deter the increased incentives for defection that greater depth 38 See Alter, Four Varieties of Delegation, supra note __, at 10 ("an agent bound to follow the directions of the delegating politicians could not possibly enhance the credibility of their commitment.") (quoting Majone, supra note __, at 110). 41 See Jackson, supra note __, at 180 ("the questions posed to the dispute settlement system often strike at the heart of the tension between the protection of nation-state sovereignty and the globalization of national economies, which require more expansive cooperative mechanisms in order to succeed internationally").
engendered. 42 Conversely, a correlation between the depth of a treaty and the independence of the tribunal that monitors it may explain why multilateral environmental agreements-many of which are "shallow" in the sense that they require governments to do little that more than their national environmental policies already require-do not provide for review of treaty disputes by an international tribunal, make such review entirely optional, or allow governments to settle any disputes through arbitration.
43 This hypothesis could be tested by determining the depth of a broad cross section of multilateral agreements and comparing the independence of the dispute settlement mechanisms they establish, controlling for type of jurisdiction, treaty membership, and other relevant causal variables.
Treaties that Regulate Public Goods or Commons Problems
Independent tribunals can also help states to resolve cooperation problems in which one state generates negative externalities that are not fully absorbed by other states. This type of problem structure can arise for treaties that regulate public goods or the global commons. 44 In these situations it is not only appropriate but necessary to consider the interests of non parties.
As an example, imagine a dispute between two states over the harvesting of a species of migratory fish, such as a dispute over fishing rights near the border of the states' exclusive economic zones. A dependent tribunal would, by definition, feel pressure to reach a decision acceptable to the two disputing states. Because those states do not internalize the full effects of their behavior, however, such a conciliatory approach would undervalue the importance of restricting the use of a finite natural resource. Stated another way, a dependent tribunal would be compelled by political constraints to minimize the effects of the parties' negative externalities upon the entire treaty membership, thereby undervaluing the treaty's preservationist objectives. 45 By contrast, an independent tribunal-particularly one that can hear arguments by others states and non-state actors-could consider these objectives with far less fear of reprisal. This conjecture too is testable by comparing different types of public goods and commons treaties with the dispute settlement options states establish for them. 42 Downs, Rocke, and Barsoon assert that, for states will comply with deep agreements, "the punishment must hurt the transgressor state at least as much as that state could gain by the violation." Id. at ___. International tribunals may not be competent to impose such punishments on their own. They may, as in the case of the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding, assist other states or intergovernmental organizations to meet out such punishments by clarifying the law and identifying conduct that violates the parties' obligations. (2000) (surveying multilateral environmental agreements and noting that they contain relatively "shallow" obligations and eschew "coercive and adversarial mechanisms such as adjudication procedures and multilateral sanctions"). 44 Of course, the depth and public goods/commons variables may point in opposite directions. For example, many environmental agreements are both shallow and involve regulation of the global commons. This may explain why relatively few treaties regulating the global environment create an international tribunals to review state conduct. (2004) ("Encouraging the parties to a dispute to reach a compromise may well produce more harmonious international relations but will not necessarily lead to optimal environmental outcomes. In many cases it may serve to restore (or enhance) comity but only at the expense of the protection and preservation of the environment.").
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Treaties that Create Rights or Benefits for Private Parties
The third type of cooperation problem that can more effectively be resolved by an independent tribunal concerns multilateral agreements for which private parties have stronger incentives to monitor and challenge violations than do states. These greater incentives may arise because the agreement expressly grants rights to private parties (as occurs, for example, in human rights and some investment treaties), or because those parties are the indirect beneficiaries of obligations between states (as is the case for many trade agreements). In these circumstances, authorizing an international tribunal to hear cases filed by private parties significantly increases the credibility of initial treaty bargains. It also promotes compliance with treaty commitments, since private litigants are also constituents of government officials and can pressure those officials to implement the tribunal's rulings in their favor.
Where a dependent tribunal hears cases by private parties, credibility enhancement and increased compliance is less likely. Dependent tribunals rely on states for their existence, not on private parties. It is states who create the tribunal, define its jurisdiction, appoint and reappoint its members, fund its operations, and decide whether it will continue to exist. 46 States make these decisions for independent tribunals too, of course, but their control is far less direct and immediate than in the case of dependent tribunals. Aware of these greater reserved powers, a decision maker serving on a dependent tribunal can anticipate a negative reaction from states if she consistently rules in favor of private parties, even assuming their claims are meritorious. An independent tribunal, by contrast, faces far fewer pressures "to pander to the governments at whose sufferance it exists." 47 The plausible relationship between independence and access by private parties suggests another empirically testable hypothesis: that the states which create independent tribunals also select private party access as a design feature to help the tribunals retain their independence over time.
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C. Dependent Tribunals and Bilateralism
In contrast to multilateral cooperation problems, dependent tribunals may be as effective as their independent brethren in resolving certain types of bilateral disputes. The relevant distinction between multilateralism and bilateralism concerns the diminished need for a tribunal to enhance credibility in purely bilateral settings. Threats of tit-for-tat reciprocity, reprisals, and other selfhelp are standard modes of bilateral interaction. More importantly, the threat of such measures may be sufficient in and of themselves to induce compliance. Where such measures are in fact sufficient, states in bilateral relationships do not need an independent tribunal to enhance the 46 See Synoptic Chart, supra note __, at 1 (listing tribunals that have become "extinct"). 47 Helfer & Slaughter, supra note __, at 313. 48 Pressure to select private party access as a design choice is likely to come from domestic interests groups, particularly those who are the rights holders or indirect beneficiaries of the international obligations the tribunal will supervise.
Page 14 of 27 credibility of their commitments, since those commitments are already credible at the time they are made. 49 Crucially, these compliance-inducing strategies remain available even after the parties to a bilateral agreement have submitted their dispute to dependent tribunal or arbitral body. Because the settlement of bilateral disputes operates in the shadow of these extrajudicial measures to promote compliance, it may be entirely appropriate for states to exert more stringent controls over a tribunal. Stated another way, dependent tribunals may be more effective at resolving certain categories of bilateral disputes precisely because they operate as an extension of nonlegal, diplomatic methods of dispute resolution and compliance inducement.
This framing of dispute settlement as an extension of diplomacy does not, however, translate to multilateral settings. Not only is the need to enhance the credibility of commitments greater in such settings for the reasons described above, but unilateral strategies for inducing compliance are far less effective.
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The foregoing analysis suggest why states continue to use ad hoc arbitration and other dependent forms of dispute resolution even while they are establishing new independent international tribunals and increasingly recognizing the jurisdiction of existing independent tribunals. The analysis also implies, however, that dependent tribunals can effectively resolve only a narrow category of disputes between states. The most pressing issues of interstate cooperation in the 21 st century-including human rights, humanitarian law, trade, and environmental protectionrequire additional credibility enhancement mechanisms and thus cannot be resolved by dependent tribunals.
III. A THEORY OF CONSTRAINED INDEPENDENCE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
Once states have made the initial decision to establish an independent international tribunal, they face a second order institutional design problem: calibrating the degree of control over the tribunal and the particular ways in which they will exercise that control. Unlike the more basic choice between dependence and independence, these more fine grained regulatory decisions limit the potential for overreaching even by tribunals whose selection and tenure rules give their judges a high degree of formal independence.
49 See Alter, Do International Courts Enhance Compliance?, supra note __, at 64. The threat of reciprocity is rarely a complete deterrent to defection, however. For this reason, even the parties in a bilateral relationship may choose to submit their disputes to a tribunal with more independent features as a way to enhance the credibility of their commitments. This may explain why many bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation agreements contain compromissory clauses conferring jurisdiction on the ICJ. 50 As Kenneth Oye has explained using a game theoretic model, "as the number of players increases the feasibility of sanctioning defectors diminishes. Strategies of reciprocity become more difficult to implement without triggering a collapse of cooperation. In two-person games, Tit-for-Tat works well because the costs of defection are focused on only one other party." Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in Cooperation Under Anarchy 1, 19-20 (1986) . By contrast, where multiple parties are involved, defection imposes costs on all parties, and "the power of strategies of reciprocity is undermined." Id. at 20.
A specific example helps to introduce this idea. Imagine that a regional group of states is negotiating a treaty to protect human rights. These states want to ensure that their commitments are credible, so they agree to set up a tribunal that possesses the core formal attributes of independence. In other words, they create a tribunal that is permanent, whose jurisdiction is compulsory, whose decision makers serve for fixed terms and can be removed only for cause, and that can receive complaints from the individual victims of human rights abuses. But these states also recognize that such a tribunal has the potential to expand its authority over time, to establish new legal norms, and to impose greater restrictions on governments. 51 To address this risk, they want a tribunal that is formally independent but whose decision makers are constrained by the structural, political, discursive environment in which they are situated.
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These constraints do not, however, create a system of judicial dependence in disguise. To the contrary, many of the regulatory mechanisms discussed below are difficult or costly to exercise, or achieve their objectives only partially or imperfectly. Some require the consent of other states, others generate opposition from domestic interest groups, and still others require a significant time or political capital to implement. These limitations on state control are design choices, not design flaws. They are part of a system of "constrained independence," in which states task judges to behave as fiduciaries 53 (albeit fiduciaries with limited mandates) rather than as closely controlled agents.
Constrained independence maximizes the benefits of delegation to independent decision-makers while minimizing its costs. It allows states to enhance the credibility of their commitments while signaling to independent courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial review bodies when they are approaching-or have exceeded-the politically palatable limits of their authority.
In addition to providing the means for states to influence the docket and jurisprudential output of international tribunals, these limited and more precise mechanisms of judicial control have a second important effect. They help to map out the contours of what Richard Steinberg has called the "strategic space" 54 within which international tribunals actually operate. This strategic space restricts the range of methodological, interpretative, and decisional choices available to independent judges. Many of these choices will be legally plausible; only a subset will also be politically tolerable.
Judges are sensitive to these political limits on their authority. But they are also participants in a global "community of law," 55 a community of domestic courts and international tribunals that helps to shield judges from overtly political influences. Triangulating these competing pressures, international judges will self-select those methodologies and interpretive tools that are both legally convincing to their brethren and that lie within broadly acceptable political parameters. In the process, they will internalize a set of discursive constraints that obviate, or at least reduce, the need for overt correction by the states subject to their jurisdiction. The participation of tribunal members in the global community of law is thus a key component of the system of constrained independence described below.
The following table illustrates the system of constrained independence for international tribunals. The left side of the table summarizes the specific control mechanisms that states use to regulate independent tribunals, grouping them into four ideal types. 56 The right side illustrates the discursive constraints of the global community of law. This community and the state control mechanisms together define the strategic space that an independent international tribunal occupies. The sections that follow describe each of the state regulatory tools in greater detail and provide real world examples. I then discuss how discursive constraints generated by the global community of law are internalized by international judges and tribunal members. 
A. Formal and structural ex ante control mechanisms
Precision in drafting commitments is perhaps the most obvious formal control mechanisms that states can exercise ex ante. Clearly defined substantive rules impose real constraints. They encourage early settlement of disputes, obviating the need for judicial interpretation in the first instance. And they inhibit the creation of expansive jurisprudence by requiring judges to provide a persuasive justification for departing from a shared textual meaning.
As scholars such as Joel Trachtman have demonstrated, however, writing comprehensive international agreements may entail substantial costs. 57 Where the costs of completing a contract is high, negotiators may adopt an alternative approach. They may tolerate some textual ambiguity, in effect agreeing to disagree over the scope of their substantive obligations, but specify which interpretive methodologies the tribunal may employ (as in Article 3.2 of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding) 58 or the degree of deference it must give to national decision makers (as in the Article 17.6 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement 59 and the national emergency clauses of human rights conventions 60 ).
These drafting devices are a subject for negotiation among governments. But what of states that are unable to convince their treaty partners to adopt their preferred textual restriction or that join a treaty regime after negotiations have concluded? For these countries, unilaterally carving out a set of issues from the dispute settlement process may be a logical response. Such carve outs take the form of reservations, either to the substantive treaty that the tribunal is interpreting or to a declaration recognizing the tribunal's jurisdiction.
Both types of reservations constrain a tribunal from venturing into areas demarcated as off limits by the state itself. And both are common practice in international law (although both can also be prohibited where states agree to do so). 61 Examples of the former are too numerous to mention. 62 Examples of the latter are also common, and include (1) reservations to declarations recognizing the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction that exempt from the Court's scrutiny disputes within a state's domestic jurisdiction, (2) restrictions on declarations filed with ITLOS limiting the tribunal's jurisdiction to specified maritime subjects, and (3) reservations to the ICCPR's First Optional Protocol specifying temporal limits which petitions the UNHRC may receive from individuals.
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A third set of structural ex ante controls relates to the details of the tribunal's operation. These encompass the rules for selection, composition, and tenure of judges. But they also include detailed rules regulating access to the tribunal, the scope of its procedures, its fact finding powers, the type and form of its decisions, the remedies it awards, and even such fundamental issues as whether its decisions are legally binding or not.
The use of these formal and structural control devices, whether singly or in combination, impose meaningful constraints on judicial activism. They do not, however, guarantee that a tribunal will scrupulously adhere to the restrictions states have imposed on it. International law's interpretive methodologies are elastic and allow decision makers a fair degree of interpretive discretion. This elasticity has enabled some tribunals to push textual or structural boundaries by using teleological or purposive approaches that reify a treaty's broad aims rather than its textual details. 64 But the move away from text is not always in favor of expanding a tribunal's authority. To the contrary, judges have also deferred to the governments whose actions they review even where their textual mandate suggests a more assertive role.
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B. Political ex ante control mechanisms
States also regulate international tribunals through political means. Some of these measures operate in the shadows; others are the product of distributions of power and resources within particular treaty regimes. Whatever their origins, these tools of political influence may be as if not more effective to calibrate the authority conferred on international decision makers and control their potential for overreaching.
Consider the procedures by which international judges and tribunal members are appointed. Often, these appointment rules differ radically from the formal appointment rules specified in the agreement establishing the court or tribunal. The Appellate Body provides a notable example. 66 The WTO Agreement provides that the seven members of the Appellate Body are to be selected by a consensus decision of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body. 67 In practice, the initial phase of the appointments process is carried out by a Selection Committee over which powerful WTO members exert significant influence. "The European Communities and the United States have enjoyed 'special privileges' at this stage of the process, enabling them to object to some candidates, which has amounted to a veto power." 68 This unilateral veto has been "used routinely by powerful members to ensure that the candidates selected to serve on the Appellate Body are not exceedingly activist, biased, or expansive lawmakers." 69 Uneven distributions of power among states circumscribe international adjudication in another way. Differences in material resources sends an informal signal to tribunal members as to which states are most likely to resist hard edged restrictions on governmental authority or fresh accretions of judicial power.
In the WTO, for example, the United States and the EC are the most powerful state actors by virtue of their large economies and their active use of WTO dispute settlement.
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According to Richard Steinberg, "judicial lawmaking that consistently results in the loss of dispute settlement cases by a powerful member (as both a complainant and a respondent) would not be sustainable politically, for it would constitute a shift in property rights that would likely engender a political reaction." 71 Yet there is little risk of such a reaction in the face of dispute settlement losses by poorer developing countries. Although the percentage of these countries involved in WTO dispute settlement proceedings has increased from its level under the GATT, significant structural and material factors 66 There is evidence of similar actions in the selection procedures for other international tribunals. See Keohane et al., supra note __, at 471 ("It was widely rumored . . . that the German government sought to rein in the ECJ by appointing a much less activist judge in the 1980s than previous German candidates, but hard evidence is virtually impossible to find. 231, 232 (1997) ("richer countries tend to be more powerful in trade negotiations than poorer countries since, in the international trade context, 'power' may be seen as a function of relative market size"); Shaffer, supra note __, at 6 (noting that the United States or EC was a party in 75 percent of WTO complaints filed, and in 84 percent of complaints that resulted in judicial decisions). 71 Steinberg, supra note __, at 268-69. Based on an empirical review of the first eight years of the WTO case law, Steinberg finds little support for such concern. Id. at 269-72. continue to impede their meaningful participation. 72 This suggests that control mechanisms may have ancillary distributional consequences.
A third political check that states use to control international tribunals ex ante (as well as ex post) relates to funding. The attempt to underfund the ICTY is a prominent example. 73 Other tribunals have experienced similar financial pressures. To take only one recent example, in 2001 the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights adopted new rules of procedure that are expected to significantly increase its own caseload and that of the Court. 74 Whether OAS member states are willing to provide the resources necessary to support the enhanced judicial activity engendered by these wider access rules is unclear, however. If they do not, "the lack of monetary contributions by the member states could seriously impede the Court [and Commission] from fulfilling [their] role of deciding human rights cases in the region." 75 A final, less obvious political check arises from the status of a newly created tribunal in relationship to other tribunals that states have created to hear similar types of disputes. The proliferation of international courts, tribunals, and quasi-judicial review bodies has been well documented. Until recently, their competition for cases had been less comprehensively explored. 76 However, where more than one judicial body have jurisdiction over a dispute, states and private parties can "forum shop" for the tribunal they believe will be the most sympathetic to their case. 77 Forum shopping may lead to expansive assertions of authority, as when a tribunal carves out a particular area of expertise as a way to attract new cases. 78 But the existence of multiple venues for dispute settlement creates competition among tribunals that curbs such expansions. The force of this constraint will depend on whether states or private parties are claimants, the competence of the alterative forum, and the ease with which disputants may move from one venue to another. These are not merely hypothetical constraints. A judge on ITLOS has noted the stiff competition his court faces from the ad hoc arbitral tribunal that states established as an alternative dispute settlement forum for law of the sea issues. 79 This competition is likely to increase as a result of recent conflicting rulings interpreting the concurrent jurisdiction of ITLOS and the tribunal. 80 C.
Formal and structural ex post control mechanisms
If, notwithstanding the ex ante controls described above, a tribunal issues a decision or series of decisions that one or more states finds objectionable, there are several ways in which states can signal their displeasure. Reinterpreting the substantive obligations of the treaty that the tribunal oversees is one obvious choice. 81 Formal amendment of the treaty is also possible. But states often make renegotiation difficult, creating cumbersome and time consuming procedural hurdles that preserve existing treaty bargains but also make the "legislative" overruling of an international tribunal harder. 82 Perhaps the most pointed threat that states can direct against an independent tribunal is to rewrite jurisdictional, access, or procedural rules to cabin its authority. Scholars are divided over the potency of these tactics. Some have argued that such threats are credible, at least where the restriction is supported by the treaty regime's most powerful states. 83 Others are more dubious, reasoning that the hurdles outlined above are sufficiently high to block most jurisdiction-stripping initiatives. 84 The existing empirical record is mixed and open to conflicting interpretations. 85 The textual modifications described above allow states to fine tune their response to putative overreaching by an independent tribunal. In contrast, the power of reelection is a more indirect and less subtle method of control. 86 Most tribunals permit their members to serve a second term, and it is widely believed that judges wish to be reelected. 87 According to some observers, the specter of reelection materially effects judicial behavior. From the judges' vantage point, of course, such influence is to be derided. 88 From a political perspective, however, it provides a measure of accountability for jurists who serve on tribunals that are otherwise highly independent.
All of the foregoing ex post control mechanisms require some degree of cooperation among states. Unilateral responses are also available. Perhaps the most famous of these existed in the GATT, where a defending state could prevent the adoption of an adverse panel report.
A different unilateral response involves adopting a strategy of exit. 89 Even if a single state is unable to convince its treaty partners to rein in a wayward tribunal, it need not acquiesce in further judicial review. To the contrary, international law generally permits a state to remove itself from a tribunal's jurisdiction, either by withdrawing a declaration recognizing its compulsory jurisdiction (as has occasionally occurred for the ICJ and, more recently, ITLOS) or by denouncing the treaty that confers such jurisdiction (as has happened with the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR). 90 Some international agreements deter this exit strategy by requiring a disaffected state to denounce the entire treaty, not merely its jurisdictional provisions. Whether a state undertakes this more consequential exit option depends upon "(1) the mix of obligations and institutions a treaty contains; (2) the costs to a state's reputation and to the credibility of its commitment to comply with other treaties; and (3) the willingness of a state to eschew exit in exchange for a greater voice in shaping the regime's future." 91 This calculus suggests that withdrawals from package deal agreements such as the WTO are unlikely, whereas withdrawals from treaties with more limited subject matters, such as human rights agreements, are more plausible. 92 
D. Political ex post control mechanisms
States use a variety of political mechanisms to control judicial overreaching by independent tribunals that are already in operation. Perhaps the most common of these involves questioning the tribunal's reasoning, identifying errors it has committed, or highlighting its abuses of authority. That governments attach importance to such "delegitimizing" strategies 93 is suggest by the pains they take to denounce objectionable decisions even when they are purely hortatory. 94 The modes through which such challenges are conveyed range from statements addressed to the general public or to communities of interested observers, to criticisms expressed at meetings of intergovernmental organizations, and, more troublingly, to direct or mediated interventions with individual judges. 95 A second ex post political control is noncompliance with the tribunal's decisions. The responses range from outright recalcitrance and defiance at one extreme to partial or delayed compliance at the other. Given the frequency with which governments are believed to shirk compliance with international as compared to domestic law, noncompliance, standing alone, may not be understood as a sanction by jurists or by observers. It may, however, be viewed in this way when used to augment challenges to a tribunal's legitimacy. As a practical matter, the efficacy of noncompliance as a judicial control mechanism is likely to vary with the state's success in linking these two strategies. Where the material or reputation costs of noncompliance are well established or fairly automatic, it will be more difficult to pin the fault on the tribunal rather than on the noncomplying state. Conversely, a noisy act of noncompliance by a powerful state that occurs early in a tribunal's life may devastate its legitimacy.
A third ex post political checking mechanism involves starving a tribunal by eliminating or reducing its diet of cases. This can be accomplished through docket control (for example, by limiting the number or types of cases filed with the tribunal, or by settling disputes before the tribunal issues its decision) or by siphoning cases away from one tribunal and submitting them to another tribunal with overlapping jurisdiction. The degree to which a state can employ these measures may depend upon whether the tribunal is authorized to review only to interstate disputes or also complaints filed by private parties. For interstate tribunals, docket control can be as simple as deciding whether or not to file a dispute in one forum or another, or to resolve it through negotiation or other non-judicial means. Controlling the case load of supranational tribunals is a far more difficult proposition. Inherent in the vary nature of supranational jurisdiction is a loss of state control over which cases a tribunal hears, relegating states to the other control mechanisms described above.
E. Discursive constraints of the global community of law
In addition to controls that states impose upon tribunals, other constraints arise from the very act of international judging and are internalized by courts, tribunals, and review bodies that participate in a "global community of law." 96 Such a community creates a sense of transnational judicial solidarity among judges that helps to shield their rulings from overtly political influences. This shielding function does not, however, give judges a blanket license to conform legal rules to their own moral or ideological values. 97 To the contrary, a community of law imposes constraints on decision makers that are equally important and equally real. 96 As stated in Toward A Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, a global community of law is "a community of interests and ideals shielded by legal language and practice. It is a community in which the participants . . . understand themselves to be linked through their participation in, comprehension of, and responsibility for legal discourse." Helfer & Slaughter, supra note __, at 370. In its fully developed form, such a community has three distinct elements. First, it is a web of relations among subnational and supranational legal actors, including national courts, international tribunals, government officials, intergovernmental organizations, and domestic interest groups, each of whom can interact directly with the others. Second, those interactions should be consistent with the incentives of the participants, allowing self-interested behavior to complement normative aspirations in shaping the contours of the community. The third attribute of a community of law "is the self-awareness of all participants that they are operating in a nominally apolitical context. They should understand themselves to be linked by a common training and set of basic normative commitments to the autonomy and integrity of the legal process." Id. at 367-70. 97 Cf. id. at 371 (stating that global community of law creates a space "that is insulated, but not isolated, from politics, economics, and society").
With regard to the act of judicial decision-making in particular, a web of relationships built upon the forms and function of law validates certain forms of legal analysis and strategic decision-making while discouraging others, fleshing out the outer contours of constrained independence (see Table 1 ). Jurists who venture beyond these discursive parameters risk significant damage to their standing in the eyes of other actors in the community. 98 This concern for reputation causes international judges to internalize norms of self-restraint that reduce the potential for overreaching and the need for ex post correction by states.
Part of this self-restraint is manifested in court-made procedural rules and methodological approaches that restrict opportunities for expansive lawmaking by tribunals. These doctrines include "screening devices to avoid deciding certain cases on their merits, incrementalist decision making strategies, and identification of subjects ill-suited for international adjudication." 99 When employing these methodologies to limit their own authority, international jurists often acknowledge the virtues of deferring to domestic actors and of considering the broader political climate in which national governments will receive their decisions. 100 Judicial self-restraint has a substantive dimension as well, as the death row phenomenon aptly illustrates. 101 The content of the death row phenomenon has been shaped by an exceptionally widespread and robust dialogue among international tribunals and national courts in many regions of the world. 102 The majority of courts and tribunals have held that the phenomenon raises serious constitutional or human rights concerns. But not all.
The UNHRC has repeatedly rejected the claim that detention on death row, no matter how prolonged, amounts to degrading treatment or punishment under the ICCPR. 103 Significantly, the UNHRC grounded its approach in both principled legal analysis and political pragmatism. Legally, the Committee recognized that a ruling recognizing the death row phenomenon could cause governments to speed up executions, a result contrary to the treaty's express goal of encouraging all states toward abolition of the death penalty. Politically, the Committee understood that adopting a more rightsprotective interpretation, particularly one strongly endorsed by European countries and tribunals, 104 would create a serious risk of noncompliance by its more diverse constituency of member states. 105 The Committee did not opt out of the global legal community; it carefully considered and distinguished the reasoning of other tribunals. But it ultimately adopted a more circumspect approach, one that was both defensible to the global community of law and sensitive to the political limits of its authority.
IV. CONCLUSION
States are creating more independent international tribunals, submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of such tribunals, and litigating disputes before such tribunals in increasing numbers. These developments appear to be inconsistent with the claim that states are rational actors, jealous of their sovereignty and dubious of delegating authority to international institutions they cannot tightly control.
This Article offers a theory of constrained independence to explain these empirical trends. It argues that states establish independent international tribunals to enhance the credibility of their commitment to particular international regimes, making it more likely that they will secure the benefits of those regimes. Having delegated authority to formally independent decision makers, states limit the potential for judicial overreaching using fine grained structural, political, and discursive controls that they can manipulate ex ante and ex post. Judicial excesses are also cabined by the pressures of professional and personal socialization of membership in a global community of law. Together, these pressures map out a strategic space for international tribunals beyond which even independent judicial decision makers are unlikely to venture. 7-8 (1989) . See also Helfer, Forum Shopping, supra note __, at 329 ("Were the Committee to adopt the ECHR's more rigorous approach, it would be setting a standard of protection so far out of touch with domestic laws that many States might be unwilling to follow it.").
